> ## Content Index > Fetch the complete content index at: https://bevnews.net/llms.txt > Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further. # Why DISCUS Urged Texas Senators to Regulate Private Label Spirits - URL: https://bevnews.net/why-discus-urged-texas-senators-to-regulate-private-label-spirits/ - Published: 2026-09-17T05:09:45.000Z - Updated: 2026-09-17T05:09:44.000Z - Author: Joel Whitaker - Tags: Strategy Why would the **Distilled Spirits Council of the U.S.** urge a Texas Senate committee to require disclosure of any financial interest a retailer may have in a distiller that produces private or contract-label products sold by the retailer? **Corey Staniscia**, DISCUS vp-state government relations, told the Texas Senate committee "the fundamental issue is not that a retailer has created another product for consumers to choose. The concern arises when the retailer has an economic interest in a product and simultaneously controls the marketplace in which that product competes against independently owned brands." We asked DISCUS if it had any evidence that a retailer had a financial interest in private label producer. A spokesperson didn't answer that question, but did point us to Staniscia's testimony in which he explained: "A distilled spirits supplier can develop a brand, advertise it, invest millions of dollars building it, and compete on quality, price, reputation, and innovation," he explained, adding: "But ultimately, that supplier does not control the retail shelf. The retailer does. The retailer determines shelf placement, displays, promotions and, importantly, what its employees recommend when a consumer walks into a store and asks, 'What bourbon should I buy?'" And right there is the nub of the whole issue. Suppliers – DISCUS's members for the most part, used to have total control of the alcohol beverage industry. But that's not so anymore. It used to be that when one went to the annual Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of America conference, wholesalers would scurry from hotel suite to hotel suite, seeking brands. But in the late 1980s and early 1900s, major distillers encouraged wholesalers to consolidate. So did major brewers. Little did they know that by encouraging consolidation, a move which was supposed to make their lives easier, suppliers were in effect passing control of distribution to the wholesalers. To be sure, it took 35-40 years for this to play out, but that is what happened. The balance of power has shifted dramatically: no longer do wholesalers have to meet a supplier's performance standards, but the supplier must meet the wholesaler's requirements. And when they don't, the end can come surprisingly quickly as we all have just seen in the collapse of **Republic National Distributing Co.** **Sazerac Co.** pulled its entire portfolio from RNDC in January 2023, which kicked off a supplier exodus including **Brown-Forman, Tito's,** and **Proximo Spirits.** As wholesalers were consolidating, giant retailers, such as **Total Wine & Spirits** and **ABC Fine Wine & Spirits** began to emerge. This was a dramatic change in the retail tier: From the Repeal of Prohibition to the 1990s, liquor retailers tended to be small, often mom-and-pop operations, although sometimes a local chain. But Total Wine & Spirits was founded in 1991 and now has 298 superstores across 30 states. ABC Fine Wine & Spirits grew slowly after the war as a Central Florida retailer. But by the late 1980s, it acquired Jax Liquors and today operates 123-125 stores from the Florida Panhandle to Miami. Retail operations this large are able to develop private label programs in which they assume little if any additional risk beyond what they assume when they buy name brand products. In doing so, they capture both the supplier and wholesaler tier profit, enabling them to offer the private label products at a substantial discount. Brand owners aren't helpless on competing against a private label brand, whose only real advantage is a lower price and placement in the retailer's store and ads. After all, a brand owner can advertise and in so doing position their product as being superior to other products – including private label. But by and large over the last 30 years, suppliers abandoned the media tools that had given them growth and power. The rise of the internet, social media and influencers led brands to shift massive amounts of their advertising budgets from TV and magazines to social media platforms like Instagram, to leverage user-generated content, and drinks finders like wine-searcher.com. In doing so, they lost the ability to influence mass purchasing decisions. Meanwhile, those mass retailers like Total Wine & Spirits and ABC in Florida gained influence with their customers. And many of their customers wanted low prices. So the mass retailers accommodated them and developed alcohol products that in many cases were quite good. Costco's Kirkland Signature is famous for outperforming or matching name brands. Trader Joe's bourbons, vodkas and seasonal liqueurs punch well above their budget price tags, and Spec's and Total Wine among other contract with distilleries to mimic top-shelf profiles for bourbon, scotch, tequila, vodka, at a fraction of the cost. In his testimony to the Texas Senate committee, DISCUS's Staniscia suggested the legislators see for themselves – go to Total Wine's website, choose a Texas pickup location and start to type in "Tito's." "You will quickly see 'We Recommend' Tower Vodka with a photo and the price for you to click on, ever before seeing Tito’s Vodka. Tower Vodka is a private label for Total Wine and priced below what you were searching." "Consumers should know when the retailer selling or recommending a product owns, controls, or has a material economic interest in that product," he said. We think consumers naturally assume a retailer has an economic interest in every product they sell – the retailer naturally wants every product to sell for as much as he can get for it. The larger the profit margin, the better. But Staniscia insinuates something darker. The statement suggests – but does not say – Total Wine has an ownership interest in Tower Vodka. He suggests it will make a difference to consumers if they know that Total Wine not only benefits on the spread between Total Wine's purchase price and what it sells Tower for, but also makes a bit of an additional profit by being one of the owners of **Dynasty Spirits Inc.**, the Dallas, Texas, company that owns the [Tower Vodka trademark.](https://tmsearch.uspto.gov/search/search-information?ref=bevnews.net) He offered no proof that Total Wine has any financial interest in Dynasty Spirits. We don't think consumers care – any more than they care that **Jim Beam** is ultimately owned by **Suntory Holdings**, of Osaka, Japan. Or that Tito's Vodka is owned by **Fifth Generation**, an Austin, Texas, company founded by Tito Beveridge in 1997\. (Beveridge owns 100% of Fifth Generation.) Nor do we think consumers would care if [**Spec's Wines, Spirits & Finer Foods**](https://specsonline.com/?ref=bevnews.net), which operates around 216-220 locations across Texas, including the 80,000-square-foot Smith Street Warehouse in downtown Houston, had an equity interest in Tito's. (As a side note, Spec's sells Tito's, but it also sells exclusive and controlled brands, private label custom brands such as **Old Bones 10 Year Reserve Straight Bourbon Whiskey**, and private-selection barrel picks bottled exclusively for them by brands like **Jefferson's.**) What consumers care about is how the product tastes, its mouthfeel – and its price. On that note, Tito's sells for $17.97/750ml, while Tower Vodka sells for $19.99 for a 1.75liter bottle. In other words, on an ounce-for-ounce basis, Tower is about 50% less expensive. Tito's generally gets high marks in reviews such as those on ABC, while many reviewers pan Tower Vodka. But *Distiller* has this review of Tower Vodka by C.T. Beck: Tower Vodka "is essentially a Tito’s knockoff sold by Total Wine. It shares many of the same qualities, and I would likely be hard pressed to tell them apart. The nose is extremely similar, albeit maybe a bit more herbal and alcoholic," one reviewer says. "The palate follows suit, but the strong pepper note I find on Tito’s is thankfully softened. Without comparing them head-to-head, I’d say the Tower is a bit better, but it’s too close to call. I think they’ve succeeded in making a reasonable substitute for Tito’s, and at $3 less a bottle, I’d choose it if they were my only options. It probably goes without saying, but I’d much rather drink **Jim Beam Original.**" On the Total Wine website for the Laurel, Md., store near us, a 1.75 liter bottle of Tower Vodka is listed at $22.29, whi;e a 1.75 liter bottle of Tito's sells for $27.99\. Some DISCUS members may be complaining that private label brands are a large part of the market in Texas. On that, they have a point: Tower Vodka and **Deep Eddy**, combined, have a 65% share. Both are Texas-born and produced, and, although Deep Eddy is now owned by **Heaven Hill**, combined they have a 65% share. Deep Eddy sells for $24.99 for a 1.75 liter bottle at Total Wine in Houston; at the Laurel, Md., store it sells for $26.99. **Heaven Hill** isn't a DISCUS member, nor is **Dynasty Spirits**, the owner of Tower Vodka and at least 30 other brands, both of which produce private-label spirits. At least one listing we saw online says Sazerac Co., produces private label, but we found nothing to confirm that. We don't know what the financials of the privately owned producers look like, but we do know from public records that: - Diageo's debt-to-sales ratio is 113% to 150% of sales, depending on whether you use net or gross debt figures. It's marketing to sales ratio is 16.2% of net sales, down from 18.1%. - Pernod Ricard's debt-to-sales ratio is about 113.4% of annual sales, and it A&P budget is about 16%. - Suntory Holdings' debt-to-sales ratio is about 22.4%, and its A&P is 15%. - Brown-Forman's debt-to-sales ratio is about 53%, and its A&P budget is about 12.2%. - Campari's debt-to-sales ratio is about 92% and its A&P is about 17%. Obviously, a company's annual debt service is nothing like 113% of its annual sales. But every dollar it must pay for debt service is a dollar that must be added to the cost ultimately paid by consumers. The downturn in bev/al consumption makes life difficult for suppliers. That's aggravated by heavy debt loads. It's no wonder suppliers would want their trade association to go after private label brands.